UNEXPECTED_KERNEL_MODE_TRAP (7f) This means a trap occurred in kernel mode, and it's a trap of a kind that the kernel isn't allowed to have/catch (bound trap) or that is always instant death (double fault). The first number in the bugcheck params is the number of the trap (8 = double fault, etc) Consult an Intel x86 family manual to learn more about what these traps are. Here is a *portion* of those codes: If kv shows a taskGate use .tss on the part before the colon, then kv. Else if kv shows a trapframe use .trap on that value Else .trap on the appropriate frame will show where the trap was taken (on x86, this will be the ebp that goes with the procedure KiTrap) Endif kb will then show the corrected stack. Arguments: Arg1: 0000000000000008, EXCEPTION_DOUBLE_FAULT Arg2: 0000000080050033 Arg3: 00000000000006f8 Arg4: fffff80003091ec0 Debugging Details: ------------------ BUGCHECK_STR: 0x7f_8 DEFAULT_BUCKET_ID: VISTA_DRIVER_FAULT PROCESS_NAME: System CURRENT_IRQL: 2 LAST_CONTROL_TRANSFER: from fffff800030c8ca9 to fffff800030c9740 STACK_TEXT: fffff880`03169ce8 fffff800`030c8ca9 : 00000000`0000007f 00000000`00000008 00000000`80050033 00000000`000006f8 : nt!KeBugCheckEx fffff880`03169cf0 fffff800`030c7172 : 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 : nt!KiBugCheckDispatch+0x69 fffff880`03169e30 fffff800`03091ec0 : 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 : nt!KiDoubleFaultAbort+0xb2 fffff880`02d1ce40 fffff880`01915c5a : 0e506e9b`ecae37b4 d499fd96`051ac8fe abb30640`6a038841 3289d0cb`4a8817f0 : nt!SeAccessCheckFromState+0x58 fffff880`02d1d530 fffff880`0191394f : 77319ae9`021ab99a b7ac2b97`00264cc1 00000000`f2de869c 00000000`00000000 : NETIO!CompareSecurityContexts+0x6a fffff880`02d1d5a0 fffff880`019159b5 : 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 : NETIO!MatchValues+0xef fffff880`02d1d5f0 fffff880`01915845 : fffffa80`08314110 fffffa80`095a1720 fffff880`02d1d818 fffff880`02d1df50 : NETIO!FilterMatch+0x95 fffff880`02d1d640 fffff880`01916ccb : 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 fffff880`02d1df50 fffff880`02d1d800 : NETIO!IndexListClassify+0x69 fffff880`02d1d6c0 fffff880`01a3f417 : fffff880`02d1db98 fffff880`02d1db98 fffff880`02d1e8d0 fffffa80`0704d030 : NETIO!KfdClassify+0xa4e fffff880`02d1da30 fffff880`01a3883e : fffff880`01b47690 00000000`00000000 fffffa80`082155c0 00000000`00000000 : tcpip!WfpAleClassify+0x57 fffff880`02d1da70 fffff880`01a37cd5 : 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 : tcpip!WfpAlepAuthorizeSend+0x94e fffff880`02d1e180 fffff880`01a3b886 : 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000011 00000000`00000000 : tcpip!WfpAleAuthorizeSend+0x325 fffff880`02d1e450 fffff880`01a3e5e4 : 00000000`00000000 fffff880`02d1e888 fffff880`02d1e890 00000000`00000000 : tcpip!WfpAleConnectAcceptIndicate+0x106 fffff880`02d1e540 fffff880`01a37019 : 00000000`00000006 fffff800`0318cc2b 00000000`00000001 00000000`00000008 : tcpip!ProcessALEForTransportPacket+0x664 fffff880`02d1e7b0 fffff880`01a65ef6 : 00000000`00000000 fffffa80`00000002 fffffa80`08b98900 fffffa80`08b98900 : tcpip!WfpProcessOutTransportStackIndication+0x329 fffff880`02d1e980 fffff880`01a6b1ee : fffffa80`08b985d0 fffff880`01911804 fffff880`01b6d9a0 fffffa80`082155c0 : tcpip!IppSendDatagramsCommon+0x526 fffff880`02d1ec50 fffff880`01a35db8 : fffffa80`082155c0 fffffa80`0704d030 fffffa80`0704d030 fffffa80`08b985d0 : tcpip!IpNlpSendDatagrams+0x3e fffff880`02d1ec90 fffff880`01a3632d : fffffa80`04dfed80 fffffa80`0906b260 fffff880`02d1f5e0 00000000`00000000 : tcpip!UdpSendMessagesOnPathCreation+0x688 fffff880`02d1f010 fffff880`01a35fb5 : fffff880`02d1f540 fffffa80`08218900 fffffa80`00000001 fffffa80`09d1bad0 : tcpip!UdpSendMessages+0x35d fffff880`02d1f400 fffff800`030d8e5a : 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 : tcpip!UdpTlProviderSendMessagesCalloutRoutine+0x15 fffff880`02d1f430 fffff880`01a36578 : fffff880`01a35fa0 fffff880`02d1f540 00000000`00000002 00000000`00000000 : nt!KeExpandKernelStackAndCalloutEx+0xda fffff880`02d1f510 fffff880`04350f45 : fffffa80`050727f0 fffffa80`081bd750 fffffa80`0820d4e0 fffffa80`09b3f65e : tcpip!UdpTlProviderSendMessages+0x78 fffff880`02d1f590 fffff880`04350ff2 : fffffa80`00000002 fffffa80`07671c20 fffffa80`06fb6dc0 fffff880`00000014 : tdx!TdxSendDatagramTransportAddress+0x2f5 fffff880`02d1f670 fffff880`0437d57f : fffffa80`06fb6c60 fffff800`030d93fb fffffa80`082163f0 fffffa80`09b3f470 : tdx!TdxTdiDispatchInternalDeviceControl+0x52 fffff880`02d1f6a0 fffff880`0437dc41 : 00000000`00000000 00000000`0000003e fffffa80`082163f0 fffffa80`04974170 : avgtdia+0x457f fffff880`02d1f6d0 fffff880`04002542 : fffffa80`09b3f470 fffffa80`082163f0 00000000`00000000 fffffa80`06fb6c60 : avgtdia+0x4c41 fffff880`02d1f700 fffff880`04002f61 : fffffa80`09b3f628 fffffa80`09b3f628 fffffa80`081073b0 fffff880`02d1f800 : netbt!TdiSendDatagram+0x187 fffff880`02d1f770 fffff880`0400f329 : fffffa80`07aa92d0 fffffa80`09b3f470 00000000`00000021 00000000`0000003e : netbt!UdpSendDatagram+0x1b1 fffff880`02d1f800 fffff880`0400f0e6 : 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000032 fffff880`04020089 : netbt!UdpSendResponse+0x4e0 fffff880`02d1f880 fffff880`04003be7 : 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 : netbt!QueryFromNet+0xb11 fffff880`02d1f9b0 fffff880`04001b47 : 00000000`00000032 fffff880`05e36044 00000000`00000032 fffffa80`0820d402 : netbt!NameSrvHndlrNotOs+0xca fffff880`02d1f9f0 fffff880`0434f325 : fffffa80`09070130 fffffa80`08200002 fffff880`02d1fcf8 fffffa80`09070130 : netbt!TdiRcvNameSrvHandler+0x367 fffff880`02d1fa90 fffff880`01a41395 : fffffa80`0820d390 00000000`00000000 fffffa80`0820d390 fffffa80`0820d390 : tdx!TdxEventReceiveMessagesTransportAddress+0x315 fffff880`02d1fc80 fffff880`01a418a4 : fffffa80`00000000 fffffa80`0820d390 00000000`00000000 fffff880`05e3603c : tcpip!UdpDeliverDatagrams+0x155 fffff880`02d1fe10 fffff880`01a5f727 : fffffa80`051d5e30 fffff880`00000000 fffffa80`08b9c670 00000000`00000000 : tcpip!UdpReceiveDatagrams+0x324 fffff880`02d1ff00 fffff880`01a5f799 : fffff880`02d20080 fffff880`01b6d9a0 fffff880`02d20090 fffffa80`05043a10 : tcpip!IppDeliverListToProtocol+0xf7 fffff880`02d1ffc0 fffff880`01a5fc90 : fffff880`01b6d9a0 fffffa80`09f73f50 00000000`00000011 fffff880`02d20080 : tcpip!IppProcessDeliverList+0x59 fffff880`02d20030 fffff880`01a5eb21 : 00000000`ff01a8c0 fffffa80`051d1138 fffff880`01b6d9a0 00000000`078d0a01 : tcpip!IppReceiveHeaderBatch+0x231 fffff880`02d20110 fffff880`01b36542 : fffffa80`08b93cb0 00000000`00000000 fffffa80`078d0a01 fffff880`00000001 : tcpip!IpFlcReceivePackets+0x651 fffff880`02d20310 fffff880`019a3afa : fffffa80`0a15a602 fffffa80`0a15a600 00000000`00000002 00000000`00000000 : tcpip!IppInspectInjectReceive+0xf2 fffff880`02d20350 fffff880`02e4837f : fffffa80`08354170 fffffa80`078d0a00 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 : fwpkclnt!FwpsInjectTransportReceiveAsync0+0x256 fffff880`02d20400 fffff880`02e4759c : fffffa80`078d0a00 fffffa80`07693b00 fffffa80`09b88148 fffffa80`09b88010 : vsdatant+0x1637f fffff880`02d20490 fffff880`02e40ca1 : fffffa80`078d0a00 fffffa80`078d0a00 fffff880`02d20d00 fffffa80`078d0af8 : vsdatant+0x1559c fffff880`02d20590 fffff880`0192c57f : fffff880`02d20c78 fffff880`02d20d90 fffffa80`047a2740 fffffa80`08dc0630 : vsdatant+0xeca1 fffff880`02d206c0 fffff880`01915619 : 00000000`00000018 fffff880`02d20c78 fffffa80`09d1bb28 fffffa80`047a2740 : NETIO! ?? ::FNODOBFM::`string'+0x7267 fffff880`02d207e0 fffff880`01916bb1 : 00000000`00000018 fffff880`02d20c78 fffff880`02d20d90 fffff880`00000000 : NETIO!ArbitrateAndEnforce+0x2a9 fffff880`02d208b0 fffff880`01b00fbb : fffff880`02d212c8 fffff880`02d20c78 fffff880`00000000 fffffa80`047a2740 : NETIO!KfdClassify+0x934 fffff880`02d20c20 fffff880`01a04d10 : 00000000`00000000 fffffa80`082155c0 fffffa80`09d1bc30 00000000`00000000 : tcpip!WFPDatagramDataShimV4+0x49b fffff880`02d20f80 fffff880`01a8073d : fffff880`02d213d8 fffff880`0181e28a fffffa80`05052f20 fffffa80`047a2740 : tcpip! ?? ::FNODOBFM::`string'+0x2b43f fffff880`02d211f0 fffff880`01a40050 : fffffa80`082155c0 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000002 00000000`00000000 : tcpip!ProcessAleForNonTcpIn+0x1ad fffff880`02d21310 fffff880`01a70fe1 : fffffa80`00000011 fffffa80`08200002 fffffa80`051d8900 00000000`00008900 : tcpip!WfpProcessInTransportStackIndication+0xb10 fffff880`02d21680 fffff880`01a40f63 : fffffa80`0820d390 fffffa80`051dc380 00000000`00000000 fffffa80`051d1000 : tcpip!InetInspectReceiveDatagram+0x121 fffff880`02d21720 fffff880`01a41315 : fffffa80`0820d390 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 fffffa80`07e59800 : tcpip!UdpBeginMessageIndication+0x83 fffff880`02d21870 fffff880`01a418a4 : fffffa80`00000000 fffffa80`0820d390 00000000`00000000 fffff880`05e3603c : tcpip!UdpDeliverDatagrams+0xd5 fffff880`02d21a00 fffff880`01a5f727 : fffffa80`051d5e30 fffff880`00000000 fffffa80`08b9c670 00000000`00000000 : tcpip!UdpReceiveDatagrams+0x324 fffff880`02d21af0 fffff880`01a5f799 : fffff880`02d21c70 fffff880`01b6d9a0 fffff880`02d21c80 fffffa80`05043a10 : tcpip!IppDeliverListToProtocol+0xf7 fffff880`02d21bb0 fffff880`01a5fc90 : fffff880`01b6d9a0 fffffa80`08043500 00000000`00000011 fffff880`02d21c70 : tcpip!IppProcessDeliverList+0x59 fffff880`02d21c20 fffff880`01a5eb21 : 00000000`ff01a8c0 fffffa80`051d1000 fffff880`01b6d9a0 00000000`08b9b301 : tcpip!IppReceiveHeaderBatch+0x231 fffff880`02d21d00 fffff880`01a5d592 : fffffa80`08b93cb0 00000000`00000000 fffffa80`08b9b301 00000000`00000001 : tcpip!IpFlcReceivePackets+0x651 fffff880`02d21f00 fffff880`01a76e5a : fffffa80`08b9b320 fffff880`02d22030 fffffa80`08b9b320 fffff880`05e40000 : tcpip!FlpReceiveNonPreValidatedNetBufferListChain+0x2b2 fffff880`02d21fe0 fffff800`030d8e5a : fffffa80`047a2740 fffff880`02d1d000 00000000`00004800 00000000`00000000 : tcpip!FlReceiveNetBufferListChainCalloutRoutine+0xda fffff880`02d22030 fffff880`01a76882 : fffff880`01a76d80 fffff880`02d22140 fffff880`efffff02 00000000`00000000 : nt!KeExpandKernelStackAndCalloutEx+0xda fffff880`02d22110 fffff880`018db0eb : fffffa80`07e598d0 00000000`00000000 fffffa80`079241a0 fffffa80`079241a0 : tcpip!FlReceiveNetBufferListChain+0xb2 fffff880`02d22180 fffff880`018a4fc6 : 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 : ndis!ndisMIndicateNetBufferListsToOpen+0xdb fffff880`02d221f0 fffff880`01827a24 : fffffa80`079241a0 00000000`00000002 00000000`00000001 00000000`00000000 : ndis!ndisMDispatchReceiveNetBufferLists+0x1d6 fffff880`02d22670 fffff880`018279e9 : 00000000`00000004 fffff880`0181efbf fffffa80`00000002 fffffa80`089404f0 : ndis!ndisMTopReceiveNetBufferLists+0x24 fffff880`02d226b0 fffff880`01827980 : fffff880`05e36012 fffffa80`08b91010 ffff0000`003b474f fffff880`06959355 : ndis!ndisFilterIndicateReceiveNetBufferLists+0x29 fffff880`02d226f0 fffff880`02e4bba5 : fffffa80`07e586b0 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000001 fffffa80`047a2740 : ndis!NdisFIndicateReceiveNetBufferLists+0x50 fffff880`02d22730 fffff880`018279e9 : fffffa80`07e586b0 fffffa80`047a2740 fffffa80`00000000 00000000`00000001 : vsdatant+0x19ba5 fffff880`02d227d0 fffff880`01827980 : fffff880`069935c0 fffffa80`08b91010 fffffa80`08b88810 00000000`00000001 : ndis!ndisFilterIndicateReceiveNetBufferLists+0x29 fffff880`02d22810 fffff880`0695c7ee : fffffa80`08b91010 00000000`00000000 fffffa80`047a2740 fffff880`069935c0 : ndis!NdisFIndicateReceiveNetBufferLists+0x50 fffff880`02d22850 fffff880`018279e9 : fffffa80`08065c90 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000001 fffff880`059080c7 : nwifi!Pt6Receive+0x296 fffff880`02d228b0 fffff880`01827980 : 00000000`00000001 fffff880`02f000bc fffffa80`080ab328 fffff880`05e36000 : ndis!ndisFilterIndicateReceiveNetBufferLists+0x29 fffff880`02d228f0 fffff880`02efc9c0 : fffff880`02f03110 00000000`00000001 00000000`00000001 fffffa80`080abd78 : ndis!NdisFIndicateReceiveNetBufferLists+0x50 fffff880`02d22930 fffff880`0183f2b7 : fffffa80`079241a0 fffffa80`0804e1f0 fffffa80`0804e1f0 00000000`00000001 : vwififlt!FilterReceiveNetBufferLists+0x158 STACK_COMMAND: kb FOLLOWUP_IP: NETIO!CompareSecurityContexts+6a fffff880`01915c5a 448b442470 mov r8d,dword ptr [rsp+70h] SYMBOL_STACK_INDEX: 4 SYMBOL_NAME: NETIO!CompareSecurityContexts+6a FOLLOWUP_NAME: MachineOwner MODULE_NAME: NETIO IMAGE_NAME: NETIO.SYS DEBUG_FLR_IMAGE_TIMESTAMP: 4bbe946f FAILURE_BUCKET_ID: X64_0x7f_8_NETIO!CompareSecurityContexts+6a BUCKET_ID: X64_0x7f_8_NETIO!CompareSecurityContexts+6a Followup: MachineOwner --------- 2: kd> lmvm NETIO start end module name fffff880`0190f000 fffff880`0196f000 NETIO (pdb symbols) c:\users\simon\desktop\symboler\netio.pdb\8422557063CC44C8B9525A086FA98C032\netio.pdb Loaded symbol image file: NETIO.SYS Image path: \SystemRoot\system32\drivers\NETIO.SYS Image name: NETIO.SYS Timestamp: Fri Apr 09 04:43:59 2010 (4BBE946F) CheckSum: 0005CFA1 ImageSize: 00060000 Translations: 0000.04b0 0000.04e4 0409.04b0 0409.04e4 It seems to be NETIO.sys but i've read alot of threads where the netio gives the bsod when it's really caused by something else, so you guys, please help me.

Bug check code 0x7F:The UNEXPECTED_KERNEL_MODE_TRAP bug check has a value of 0x0000007F. This bug check indicates that the Intel CPU generated a trap and the kernel failed to catch this trap. This trap could be a bound trap (a trap the kernel is not permitted to catch) or a double fault (a fault that occurred while processing an earlier fault, which always results in a system failure). Have a look to this Microsoft article for resolution. This posting is provided "AS IS" with no warranties or guarantees , and confers no rights. Microsoft Student Partner Microsoft Certified Professional Microsoft Certified Systems Administrator: Security Microsoft Certified Systems Engineer: Security Microsoft Certified Technology Specialist: Windows Server 2008 Active Directory, Configuration Microsoft Certified Technology Specialist: Windows Server 2008 Network Infrastructure, Configuration

Bug Check 0x7F: UNEXPECTED_KERNEL_MODE_TRAP 0x00000008 , or Double Fault , indicates that an exception occurs during a call to the handler for a prior exception. Typically, the two exceptions are handled serially. However, there are several exceptions that cannot be handled serially, and in this situation the processor signals a double fault. There are two common causes of a double fault: * A kernel stack overflow. This overflow occurs when a guard page is hit, and the kernel tries to push a trap frame. Because there is no stack left, a stack overflow results, causing the double fault. * A hardware problem. It may caused by ZoneAlarm, which you have installed. Update the network drivers first . You can also try this Hotfix if updating the network driver doesn't fix it: Stop error message when you run an application that transfers data by using the UDP protocol in Windows Server 2008 R2 or in Windows 7: "STOP 0x0000007F" http://support.microsoft.com/kb/981180/en-us When this doesn't fix it, remove ZoneAlarm. best regards André"A programmer is just a tool which converts caffeine into code" CLIP- Stellvertreter http://www.winvistaside.de/

Thx alot to both of you, the bluescreens are quite rarely so i'll guess it'll be a while before i've runned trough all steps. When it's done i'll be posting here to tell you which one did stop the issue. Thanks!

You have this driver vsdatant in the call stack and this is ZoneAlarm. So update the driver, install the hotfix and if this doesn't fix it, remove ZoneAlarm."A programmer is just a tool which converts caffeine into code" CLIP- Stellvertreter http://www.winvistaside.de/