Server Restarts unexpectedly
Hi, Recently our server restarted unexpectedly. Server Model: HP Proliant BL460c G6 OS: Windows 2008 R2 Standard. Can anyone tell me what causes the problem? The memory dump analysis result is below. Microsoft (R) Windows Debugger Version 6.11.0001.404 X86 Copyright (c) Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved. Loading Dump File [D:\backup server memory dump\MEMORY.DMP] Kernel Summary Dump File: Only kernel address space is available Symbol search path is: http://msdl.microsoft.com/download/symbols Executable search path is: Windows 7 Kernel Version 7600 MP (12 procs) Free x64 Product: Server, suite: TerminalServer SingleUserTS Built by: 7600.16695.amd64fre.win7_gdr.101026-1503 Machine Name: Kernel base = 0xfffff800`01e1b000 PsLoadedModuleList = 0xfffff800`02058e50 Debug session time: Sun Jul 8 20:16:46.327 2012 (GMT+4) System Uptime: 4 days 1:27:07.612 Loading Kernel Symbols ............................................................... ................................................................ ..................... Loading User Symbols Loading unloaded module list ............. ******************************************************************************* * * * Bugcheck Analysis * * * ******************************************************************************* Use !analyze -v to get detailed debugging information. BugCheck 7F, {8, 80050033, 6f8, fffff80001e53eb0} *** ERROR: Symbol file could not be found. Defaulted to export symbols for mfewfpk.sys - *** ERROR: Module load completed but symbols could not be loaded for cpqteam.sys *** ERROR: Module load completed but symbols could not be loaded for bxnd60a.sys *** ERROR: Module load completed but symbols could not be loaded for evbda.sys Probably caused by : NETIO.SYS ( NETIO!CompareSecurityContexts+6a ) Followup: MachineOwner --------- 11: kd> !analyze -v ******************************************************************************* * * * Bugcheck Analysis * * * ******************************************************************************* UNEXPECTED_KERNEL_MODE_TRAP (7f) This means a trap occurred in kernel mode, and it's a trap of a kind that the kernel isn't allowed to have/catch (bound trap) or that is always instant death (double fault). The first number in the bugcheck params is the number of the trap (8 = double fault, etc) Consult an Intel x86 family manual to learn more about what these traps are. Here is a *portion* of those codes: If kv shows a taskGate use .tss on the part before the colon, then kv. Else if kv shows a trapframe use .trap on that value Else .trap on the appropriate frame will show where the trap was taken (on x86, this will be the ebp that goes with the procedure KiTrap) Endif kb will then show the corrected stack. Arguments: Arg1: 0000000000000008, EXCEPTION_DOUBLE_FAULT Arg2: 0000000080050033 Arg3: 00000000000006f8 Arg4: fffff80001e53eb0 Debugging Details: ------------------ BUGCHECK_STR: 0x7f_8 DEFAULT_BUCKET_ID: VISTA_DRIVER_FAULT PROCESS_NAME: System CURRENT_IRQL: 2 LAST_CONTROL_TRANSFER: from fffff80001e8aca9 to fffff80001e8b740 STACK_TEXT: fffff880`02663ee8 fffff800`01e8aca9 : 00000000`0000007f 00000000`00000008 00000000`80050033 00000000`000006f8 : nt!KeBugCheckEx fffff880`02663ef0 fffff800`01e89172 : 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 : nt!KiBugCheckDispatch+0x69 fffff880`02664030 fffff800`01e53eb0 : 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 : nt!KiDoubleFaultAbort+0xb2 fffff880`0267fc20 fffff880`00c06c5a : fffffa80`18c92010 fffff880`013798f3 fffffa80`17b9b3a0 fffff800`01fc02dd : nt!SeAccessCheckFromState+0x58 fffff880`02680310 fffff880`00c0494f : 00000000`000007ff 00000000`00000020 00000000`00000000 fffff880`00c06e77 : NETIO!CompareSecurityContexts+0x6a fffff880`02680380 fffff880`00c069b5 : fffffa80`07271770 fffff880`00e5737a fffff880`02680978 00000000`00000000 : NETIO!MatchValues+0xef fffff880`026803d0 fffff880`00c06845 : fffffa80`1729e170 fffffa80`185508d0 fffff880`026805f8 fffff880`02680d30 : NETIO!FilterMatch+0x95 fffff880`02680420 fffff880`00c07ccb : 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000010 fffff880`02680d30 fffff880`026805e0 : NETIO!IndexListClassify+0x69 fffff880`026804a0 fffff880`01c40417 : fffff880`02680978 fffff880`02680978 fffff880`026816b0 fffffa80`1981c1f0 : NETIO!KfdClassify+0xa4e fffff880`02680810 fffff880`01c3983e : fffff880`01d48690 00000000`00000000 fffffa80`06aadb50 00000000`00000000 : tcpip!WfpAleClassify+0x57 fffff880`02680850 fffff880`01c38cd5 : 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 : tcpip!WfpAlepAuthorizeSend+0x94e fffff880`02680f60 fffff880`01c3c886 : 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000011 00000000`00000000 : tcpip!WfpAleAuthorizeSend+0x325 fffff880`02681230 fffff880`01c3f5e4 : 00000000`00000000 fffff880`02681668 fffff880`02681670 fffff880`00c1d57f : tcpip!WfpAleConnectAcceptIndicate+0x106 fffff880`02681320 fffff880`01c38019 : 00000000`000200ff 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000008 : tcpip!ProcessALEForTransportPacket+0x664 fffff880`02681590 fffff880`01c66ef6 : 00000000`00000000 00000020`00000002 fffffa80`16b68900 fffffa80`07458900 : tcpip!WfpProcessOutTransportStackIndication+0x329 fffff880`02681760 fffff880`01c6c1ee : fffffa80`16b616e0 fffff880`00c02804 fffff880`01d6e9a0 fffffa80`06aadb50 : tcpip!IppSendDatagramsCommon+0x526 fffff880`02681a30 fffff880`01c36db8 : fffffa80`06aadb50 fffffa80`1981c1f0 fffffa80`1981c1f0 fffffa80`16b616e0 : tcpip!IpNlpSendDatagrams+0x3e fffff880`02681a70 fffff880`01c3732d : fffffa80`18a57680 fffffa80`1803f0e0 fffff880`026823c0 00000000`00000000 : tcpip!UdpSendMessagesOnPathCreation+0x688 fffff880`02681df0 fffff880`01c36fb5 : fffff880`02682320 fffffa80`182b8900 fffff880`00000001 fffffa80`0745c1d0 : tcpip!UdpSendMessages+0x35d fffff880`026821e0 fffff800`01e9ae5a : fffff880`02682570 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 : tcpip!UdpTlProviderSendMessagesCalloutRoutine+0x15 fffff880`02682210 fffff880`01c37578 : fffff880`01c36fa0 fffff880`02682320 00000000`00000002 00000000`00000000 : nt!KeExpandKernelStackAndCalloutEx+0xda fffff880`026822f0 fffff880`00fa7f45 : fffffa80`072a2dc0 fffffa80`1ae3fc00 fffffa80`108c8010 fffffa80`1895345e : tcpip!UdpTlProviderSendMessages+0x78 fffff880`02682370 fffff880`00fa7ff2 : fffffa80`073cfa02 fffffa80`1803a690 fffffa80`1812df28 fffffa80`1803a690 : tdx!TdxSendDatagramTransportAddress+0x2f5 fffff880`02682450 fffff880`00e02542 : 00000000`00000000 fffffa80`108b4790 00000000`00000000 fffffa80`1812de10 : tdx!TdxTdiDispatchInternalDeviceControl+0x52 fffff880`02682480 fffff880`00e02f61 : fffffa80`18953428 fffffa80`18953428 fffffa80`18f6a320 fffff880`02682580 : netbt!TdiSendDatagram+0x187 fffff880`026824f0 fffff880`00e0f329 : fffffa80`17675e20 fffffa80`18953270 00000000`00000021 00000000`0000003e : netbt!UdpSendDatagram+0x1b1 fffff880`02682580 fffff880`00e0f0e6 : 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000032 fffff880`00e20089 : netbt!UdpSendResponse+0x4e0 fffff880`02682600 fffff880`00e03be7 : 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 : netbt!QueryFromNet+0xb11 fffff880`02682730 fffff880`00e01b47 : 00000000`00000032 fffffa80`0fff8282 00000000`00000032 fffffa80`108c8002 : netbt!NameSrvHndlrNotOs+0xca fffff880`02682770 fffff880`00fa6325 : fffffa80`17696080 fffffa80`108b0002 fffff880`02682a78 fffffa80`17696080 : netbt!TdiRcvNameSrvHandler+0x367 fffff880`02682810 fffff880`01c42395 : fffffa80`108b0010 00000000`00000000 fffffa80`108b0010 fffffa80`108b0010 : tdx!TdxEventReceiveMessagesTransportAddress+0x315 fffff880`02682a00 fffff880`01c428a4 : fffffa80`00000000 fffffa80`108b0010 00000000`00000000 fffffa80`0fff827a : tcpip!UdpDeliverDatagrams+0x155 fffff880`02682b90 fffff880`01c60727 : fffffa80`0740de30 00000000`00000000 fffffa80`16903840 00000000`00000000 : tcpip!UdpReceiveDatagrams+0x324 fffff880`02682c80 fffff880`01c60799 : fffff880`02682e00 fffff880`01d6e9a0 fffff880`02682e10 fffffa80`07270530 : tcpip!IppDeliverListToProtocol+0xf7 fffff880`02682d40 fffff880`01c60c90 : fffff880`01d6e9a0 fffffa80`182ba500 00000000`00000011 fffff880`02682e00 : tcpip!IppProcessDeliverList+0x59 fffff880`02682db0 fffff880`01c5fb21 : fffff880`ff1ea8c0 fffffa80`0743b138 fffff880`01d6e9a0 00000000`182b0b01 : tcpip!IppReceiveHeaderBatch+0x231 fffff880`02682e90 fffff880`01d37542 : fffffa80`168f9c90 00000000`00000000 fffffa80`182b0b01 fffff880`00000001 : tcpip!IpFlcReceivePackets+0x651 fffff880`02683090 fffff880`017a8afa : fffffa80`18054202 fffffa80`18054240 00000000`00000002 00000000`00000000 : tcpip!IppInspectInjectReceive+0xf2 fffff880`026830d0 fffff880`0137dc3f : fffffa80`0735a8d0 fffffa80`182b0b80 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000078 : fwpkclnt!FwpsInjectTransportReceiveAsync0+0x256 fffff880`02683180 fffff880`0137f24a : fffffa80`182b0b80 00000000`00000000 fffffa80`182b0b80 fffffa80`1423d7e0 : mfewfpk+0x8c3f fffff880`026831f0 fffff880`0137f440 : fffffa80`182b0b80 fffffa80`0735bf50 00000000`00000002 fffffa80`1423d820 : mfewfpk+0xa24a fffff880`02683240 fffff880`013800dd : fffff880`02683820 fffffa80`182b0b80 fffffa80`1423d7e0 fffffa80`0735bf50 : mfewfpk+0xa440 fffff880`02683270 fffff880`0138059d : fffff880`02683920 fffff880`02683920 00000000`00000000 fffffa80`0ff72010 : mfewfpk+0xb0dd fffff880`026832e0 fffff880`00c1d57f : fffffa80`1423d7e0 fffff880`02683920 fffff880`02683920 00000000`00000000 : mfewfpk+0xb59d fffff880`02683320 fffff880`00c074db : fffffa80`17640018 fffff880`02683808 fffffa80`0ff72068 fffffa80`094da770 : NETIO! ?? ::FNODOBFM::`string'+0x7267 fffff880`02683440 fffff880`01d01fbb : fffff880`02683e58 fffff880`02683808 fffff880`02683e58 fffffa80`094da770 : NETIO!KfdClassify+0x24b fffff880`026837b0 fffff880`01c05d10 : 00000000`00000000 fffffa80`06aadb50 fffffa80`0ff72170 00000000`00000100 : tcpip!WFPDatagramDataShimV4+0x49b fffff880`02683b10 fffff880`01c8173d : fffff880`02683f68 fffff880`01c28ba4 00000000`00000002 fffffa80`094da770 : tcpip! ?? ::FNODOBFM::`string'+0x2b43f fffff880`02683d80 fffff880`01c41050 : fffffa80`06aadb50 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000002 00000000`0000000b : tcpip!ProcessAleForNonTcpIn+0x1ad fffff880`02683ea0 fffff880`01c71fe1 : fffffa80`00000011 fffffa80`108b0002 fffffa80`07438900 00000000`00008900 : tcpip!WfpProcessInTransportStackIndication+0xb10 fffff880`02684210 fffff880`01c41f63 : fffffa80`108b0010 fffffa80`072f3820 00000000`00000000 fffffa80`0743b000 : tcpip!InetInspectReceiveDatagram+0x121 fffff880`026842b0 fffff880`01c42315 : fffffa80`108b0010 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 fffff880`01c6f17d : tcpip!UdpBeginMessageIndication+0x83 fffff880`02684400 fffff880`01c428a4 : fffffa80`00000000 fffffa80`108b0010 00000000`00000000 fffffa80`094db024 : tcpip!UdpDeliverDatagrams+0xd5 fffff880`02684590 fffff880`01c60727 : fffffa80`0740de30 00000000`00000000 fffffa80`16903840 00000000`00000000 : tcpip!UdpReceiveDatagrams+0x324 fffff880`02684680 fffff880`01c60799 : fffff880`02684800 fffff880`01d6e9a0 fffff880`02684810 fffffa80`07270530 : tcpip!IppDeliverListToProtocol+0xf7 fffff880`02684740 fffff880`01c60c90 : fffff880`01d6e9a0 fffffa80`094da8a0 00000000`00000011 fffff880`02684800 : tcpip!IppProcessDeliverList+0x59 fffff880`026847b0 fffff880`01c5fb21 : fffff880`ff1ea8c0 fffffa80`0743b000 fffff880`01d6e9a0 00000000`168fd801 : tcpip!IppReceiveHeaderBatch+0x231 fffff880`02684890 fffff880`01c5e592 : fffffa80`168f9c90 00000000`00000000 fffffa80`168fd801 00000000`00000001 : tcpip!IpFlcReceivePackets+0x651 fffff880`02684a90 fffff880`01c77e5a : fffffa80`168fd830 fffff880`02684bc0 fffffa80`168fd830 00000000`00000000 : tcpip!FlpReceiveNonPreValidatedNetBufferListChain+0x2b2 fffff880`02684b70 fffff800`01e9ae5a : fffffa80`094da770 fffff880`02680000 00000000`00004800 00000000`00000000 : tcpip!FlReceiveNetBufferListChainCalloutRoutine+0xda fffff880`02684bc0 fffff880`01c77882 : fffff880`01c77d80 fffff880`02684cd0 00000000`00000002 fffffa80`18948d30 : nt!KeExpandKernelStackAndCalloutEx+0xda fffff880`02684ca0 fffff880`00f130eb : fffffa80`169018d0 00000000`00000000 fffffa80`076c71a0 fffff880`00e5ebb6 : tcpip!FlReceiveNetBufferListChain+0xb2 fffff880`02684d10 fffff880`00edcfc6 : fffffa80`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000008 : NDIS!ndisMIndicateNetBufferListsToOpen+0xdb fffff880`02684d80 fffff880`00e56ef1 : fffffa80`076c71a0 00000000`00000002 00000000`00000001 fffff880`00e60b9c : NDIS!ndisMDispatchReceiveNetBufferLists+0x1d6 fffff880`02685200 fffff880`0c509202 : 00000000`00001001 fffffa80`0991e010 fffffa80`0990c000 fffffa80`094db000 : NDIS!NdisMIndicateReceiveNetBufferLists+0xc1 fffff880`02685250 fffff880`00f130eb : 00000000`00000000 fffffa80`17c84b60 fffffa80`17c84c68 fffffa80`0990d8d0 : cpqteam+0x9202 fffff880`02685320 fffff880`00edd165 : 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 fffff800`01e6b00e : NDIS!ndisMIndicateNetBufferListsToOpen+0xdb fffff880`02685390 fffff880`00e56ef1 : fffffa80`076421a0 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 fffffa80`17eba310 : NDIS!ndisMDispatchReceiveNetBufferLists+0x375 fffff880`02685810 fffff880`0c0ffaf6 : 00000000`00000000 fffffa80`0772d110 00000000`00000001 fffffa80`094da770 : NDIS!NdisMIndicateReceiveNetBufferLists+0xc1 fffff880`02685860 fffff880`0c0ffc6d : fffff880`02685970 fffffa80`07e4b2d0 fffffa80`1c534b60 fffff800`01e6b000 : bxnd60a+0x10af6 fffff880`026858d0 fffff880`01491d55 : 00000000`00000000 fffffa80`075eb000 fffff880`0153cfb0 00000000`00000000 : bxnd60a+0x10c6d fffff880`02685940 fffff880`014921a8 : 00000000`00000150 fffffa80`06b9ab50 fffff880`02685a80 fffff880`0150bdd8 : evbda+0xcd55 fffff880`026859c0 fffff880`014923be : fffffa80`06b8e010 fffffa80`06b9ab50 00000000`00030000 fffffa80`06b9ab50 : evbda+0xd1a8 fffff880`02685a40 fffff880`01492f23 : fffffa80`06b8e010 fffffa80`06b8e010 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 : evbda+0xd3be fffff880`02685c00 fffff880`01493433 : 00000000`00000000 fffffa80`06b8e010 fffffa80`06b8e000 00000000`00030000 : evbda+0xdf23 STACK_COMMAND: kb FOLLOWUP_IP: NETIO!CompareSecurityContexts+6a fffff880`00c06c5a 448b442470 mov r8d,dword ptr [rsp+70h] SYMBOL_STACK_INDEX: 4 SYMBOL_NAME: NETIO!CompareSecurityContexts+6a FOLLOWUP_NAME: MachineOwner MODULE_NAME: NETIO IMAGE_NAME: NETIO.SYS DEBUG_FLR_IMAGE_TIMESTAMP: 4a5bc18a FAILURE_BUCKET_ID: X64_0x7f_8_NETIO!CompareSecurityContexts+6a BUCKET_ID: X64_0x7f_8_NETIO!CompareSecurityContexts+6a Followup: MachineOwner ---------
July 13th, 2012 12:51pm

I beleive Kernel Mode Trap is typically a driver issue. The beginning section gives file details; BugCheck 7F, {8, 80050033, 6f8, fffff80001e53eb0} *** ERROR: Symbol file could not be found. Defaulted to export symbols for mfewfpk.sys - *** ERROR: Module load completed but symbols could not be loaded for cpqteam.sys *** ERROR: Module load completed but symbols could not be loaded for bxnd60a.sys *** ERROR: Module load completed but symbols could not be loaded for evbda.sys Probably caused by : NETIO.SYS ( NETIO!CompareSecurityContexts+6a ) I'd recommend updating all your drivers, specifically network related. - mfewfpk.sys belongs to McAfee - cpqteam.sys belongs to Compaq NIC teaming - bxnd60a.sys and evbda.sys belong to broadcom netxtreme IIJason Wilcox
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July 13th, 2012 1:23pm

In addition to Jason suggestion. Please contact Microsoft Customer Support Service (CSS). To obtain the phone numbers for specific technology request, please refer to the website listed below: http://support.microsoft.com/default.aspx?scid=fh;EN-US;PHONENUMBERS If you are outside the US, please refer to http://support.microsoft.com for regional support phone numbers. Thanks
July 13th, 2012 6:39pm

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